Commentary on Is inflation targeting best-practice monetary policy? by Benjamin M. Friedman
conflicting evidence. The recent paper by Laurence
Ball and Niamh Sheridan, for example, offers a quite
different interpretation of the same experience that
Levin et al. study: “This paper asks whether inflation
targeting improves economic performance, as meas-
ured by the behavior of inflation, output, and interest
rates...Once one controls for regression to the mean,
there is no evidence that inflation targeting improves
performance”.3
The main issues in Faust and Henderson’s
paper, however, are conceptual. In particular, they
continually—and rightly—highlight the role of
inflation targeting as a way for the central bank to
communicate with the public. They approvingly
quote Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen to the
effect that among the “important features of infla-
tion targeting are vigorous efforts to communicate
with the public about the plans and objectives of the
monetary authorities...” (p. 118, emphasis added
by Faust and Henderson).4 They begin their own
paper by saying, “The core requirements of inflation
targeting are an explicit long-run inflation goal and
a strong commitment to transparency” (my empha-
sis). And they go on to say, “Not only are ITF [infla-
tion targeting framework] central banks among the
most transparent in the world, they have experi-
mented aggressively with ways to make communi-
cation with the public more effective” (p. 117).
I disagree. As typically practiced today, inflation
targeting is a framework not for communicating
the central bank’s goals and policies but for obscur-
ing them. In crucial ways it is not a window but a
screen. It promotes not transparency—at least not in
the dictionary sense of the word—but opaqueness.
The key issue here, as Faust and Henderson
clearly understand, is multiple goals. Monetary policy
has one instrument: typically today some short-term
3 Ball and Sheridan (2003, abstract).




acaulay—not Frederick Macaulay, who
did economic research on interest rates,
but the great historian of the British
empire, Thomas Babington Macaulay—wrote that
the benefactors of mankind are customarily attacked
by “the dunces of their own generation” for going
too far, as well as by “the dunces of a future gener-
ation” for not going far enough.1 The consensus on
display at today’s conference, and perhaps more
broadly in the economics profession as well, is that
inflation targeting where it is already in practice
is, and wherever it is adopted in the future will be,
a significant benefactor of, if not mankind, then at
least monetary policy. Compared with that apparent
consensus, and with today’s paper by Jon Faust and
Dale Henderson, my view is that of Macaulay’s
dunces both of the present and of the future: I will
argue that inflation targeting goes too far—or, what
in this context amounts to the same thing, takes us
in a direction we should not want to go. And I will
also argue that while Faust and Henderson’s paper
contains many valid and important criticisms of
inflation targeting, they do not go nearly far enough
in following the logical implications of the criticisms
they offer.
Whether inflation targeting has led to superior
outcomes for monetary policy in countries whose
central banks have already adopted this practice is,
of course, an empirical matter.2 The paper presented
at this conference by Andrew Levin, Fabio Natalucci,
and Jeremy Piger (2004, p. 75) concludes that “infla-
tion targeting (IT) has played a role in anchoring
inflation expectations and in reducing the intrinsic
persistence of inflation.” But there is also plenty of
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2 Faust and Henderson opened the version of their paper that they
presented at the conference by flatly declaring, “The inflation targeting
framework (ITF) has been a great success around the world.” In this
version they have abandoned that claim.
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interest rate, but alternatively the quantitative change
in the central bank’s liabilities. As Tinbergen showed
decades ago, in the absence of degeneracy or other
pathologies, the solution to a problem with one
instrument and multiple targets can always be
expressed in terms of the intended trajectory for any
one arbitrarily chosen target. So far, so good. But
the question Tinbergen did not address is whether
that way of describing the solution promotes or
subverts public understanding of what the policy-
maker is doing, and why.
Faust and Henderson’s way of putting this
matter—which I like very much—is to think in terms
of the mean inflation rate and the variability of infla-
tion. Inflation targeting communicates well about
mean inflation. As they point out, however, “agree-
ment regarding the mean inflation rate has very
few practical consequences at any finite horizon”
(p. 117). By contrast, inflation targeting does not
communicate at all well about how much inflation
should vary, or why.
There are at least two reasons why policymakers
should expect, indeed want, inflation to vary. One,
of course, is the unpleasant fact of technical errors.
More central to this entire line of argument is the
policymaker’s concern for other goals of monetary
policy. (Within the literature of inflation targeting
this issue is made most explicit in Lars Svensson’s
formulation, in which the key decision is how rapidly
to bring inflation back to the desired rate after some
departure from it.5) The failure of most inflation
targeting schemes, as implemented by actual central
banks, to say anything about how much inflation
variability the central bank will tolerate, or why, is
also a failure to say anything about any goals of
monetary policy other than inflation, or about the
relationship between those goals and the inflation
goal.
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, I believe
this failure is intentional on the part of the central
banks that adopt this framework.6 As Faust and
Henderson put it, “One of the most famous principles
of strategic skewing in the folk wisdom of central
banking is that central banks should ‘do what they
do, but only talk about inflation’.” They go on to say
that “the ITF might be viewed as an application of
this folk wisdom. Without the folk wisdom, it is diffi-
cult to imagine why a policy of optimization with
multiple conflicting goals would be called ‘inflation
targeting.’ Calling reports on all aspects of policy
‘inflation reports’ is an analogous misnomer. The
folk wisdom would also justify discussing goals
other than inflation only as they affect the horizon
over which one intends to hit the inflation target”
(p. 132).
They obviously have in mind, for example, the
Bank of England. The Bank of England, however, is
by no means the only central bank to exhibit this
form of anti-transparency. For example, the Bank of
Canada’s one-page public explanation of its policy-
making framework, entitled “Canada’s Inflation-
Control Strategy” and prominently printed on the
inside front cover of the Bank’s regular Monetary
Policy Report, has only three sentences bearing on
the strategy’s underlying rationale: “Inflation con-
trol is not an end to itself; it is the means whereby
monetary policy contributes to solid economic
performance. Low inflation allows the economy to
function more effectively. This contributes to better
economic growth over time and works to moderate
cyclical fluctuation in output and employment.”7
There is no mention of any tension, at any horizon,
between the Bank’s inflation goal and output,
employment, or any other matter of potential con-
cern to monetary policy. (The remainder of the state-
ment, devoted to operational considerations, also
gives no hint of any reason, beyond technical errors,
for inflation ever to depart from the desired rate.)
What is the import of all this? As Faust and
Henderson write, “the primary shortcoming of the
ITF communication policy is in making clear the
roles and balance of multiple goals...[T]he ITF as
implemented often involves elements that are liter-
ally inconsistent with best-practice policy and, in
any case, obfuscates some basic issues” (p. 124).
Further, “any discussion of stability of prices or infla-
tion must inevitably raise issues of other goals...
[S]everal aspects of the ITF as practiced do not pro-
vide a natural and straightforward framework for
communicating this fact” (p. 126).
Given this assessment—which I believe is 
correct—two questions follow: Is this aspect of
inflation targeting, as actually practiced, incidental
or deliberate? And, in the end, is it only about how
central banks talk—although that too is clearly
important—or does it also have implications for what
central banks do?
7 Bank of Canada, Monetary Policy Report, April 2003, inside front
cover page.
5 Svensson (1997).
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Faust and Henderson imply—and elsewhere I
have argued more directly—that the connection is
deliberate.8As they note, inflation targeting appeared
on the policymaking scene at a time when the press-
ing need, throughout the industrialized world, was
to reduce the ongoing rate of inflation. As I have also
argued, the intellectual background against which
inflation targeting emerged consisted of the time-
inconsistency discussion and the forward-looking
Phillips curve; and both of these lines of thought
naturally lend themselves to the kind of obfuscation
that inflation targeting embodies. The crucial impli-
cation of time inconsistency, not just for monetary
policy but for a broad class of problems (lender-of-
last-resort policy, for example), is that misleading
people about the policymaker’s likely actions—if it
is possible to do so—can induce beneficial behavior.
But the same implication is also inherent in any
model based on the standard forward-looking Phillips
curve: The lower is the public’s expectation of future
inflation, the more favorable is the trade-off between
inflation and output that the policymaker faces in
the present—in other words, less inflation for given
output, or more output for given inflation.
Given the central role in macroeconomics now
played by the forward-looking Phillips curve, this
logic, in both simple and sophisticated forms, is per-
vasive. It is no surprise, for example, that in section
1 of Michael Woodford’s paper for this conference
(on “Advantages of an Explicit Target for Monetary
Policy”), section 1.1 is titled “Central Banking as the
Management of Expectations” (emphasis added).
This is not the place to go over yet again the concerns
I have expressed elsewhere about this way of think-
ing about monetary policy.9 The question to pose,
however, is whether, when the central bank in fact
has multiple goals but quantifies only one—indeed,
when it refuses to talk explicitly about any of the
others, except in terms of how they bear on the
achievement of that one—we should call this kind
of communications policy the management of
expectations or the manipulation of expectations.
As Woodford and many others have ably shown,
the public’s expectations matter for economic
behavior, including the efficacy of monetary policy,
and so even if all that the obfuscation inherent in
inflation targeting did were to affect expectations,
that in itself would be important. But there is also
ground to believe that inflation targeting may distort
not just what the central bank says but what it does.
One reason for thinking so, which Faust and
Henderson note, is “the ITF premise that the threat
of public criticism affects the incentives of the central
bank and thereby the course of policy” (p. 129). But
as they also rightly point out, “The ITF communica-
tion policy is tilted heavily toward emphasis on sta-
bilizing inflation” (p. 126). As a result, “Given the
skewing of communication in the ITF...a weak policy-
maker may find it safest to excessively smooth infla-
tion.” Hence, “the ITF seems as likely to complicate
as to facilitate achieving a proper balance of multiple
goals by a weak policymaker” (p. 131).
I have little to add to this important (and, I believe,
correct) line of argument, other than to say that it
probably applies to strong policymakers as well as
weak ones—what Faust and Henderson call “policy-
maker aversion to criticism” is pervasive—and to
suggest that it calls back into question an often-made
claim that they dismiss out of hand at the outset of
their paper: namely, that in many contexts the debate
over inflation targeting is really a debate over what
properly belongs in the central bank’s preference
function. Faust and Henderson are at pains to distin-
guish what Mervyn King has colorfully called “infla-
tion nutters” from what they here label “NETers.”10
For practical purposes, however, these two positions
are isomorphic. Their respective implications for
monetary policy are observationally equivalent.
There is also a second reason for thinking that
the inflation-targeting framework affects not just
what the central bank says but also what it does. Put
simply, the point is that language matters. David
Hume, who importantly influenced the shaping of
our discipline in its formative years, both directly
and even more so through his influence on Adam
Smith, had this to say about how skewed language
affected the central political issue in the Britain of
his day (monarchy versus republic): “The Tories have
been obliged for so long to talk in the republican stile
that they...have at length embraced the sentiments
as well as the language of their adversaries.”11
We are all familiar with instances in our own
day of the same phenomenon. For example, how
might research on monetary policy (and macro-
economics more generally) have evolved differently
if the particular assumption about expectations
10 See King (1997).
11 Hume (1741, p. 72).
8 See, again, Friedman (2003).




introduced by Muth and Lucas had been labeled
“super-smart-agents expectations,” or, perhaps more
even-handedly, “model-consistent expectations,”
rather than the far more compelling “rational expec-
tations”? Might the work now exploring the impli-
cations of “bounded rationality” have developed
earlier, or differently, under a less biased label?
To return to the case at hand, it is not too great
a leap to conjecture that one consequence of con-
straining the discussion of monetary policy to be
carried out entirely in terms of an optimal inflation
trajectory will be that concern for real outcomes
will atrophy, or even disappear from policymakers’
consideration altogether. Nor is it unreasonable to
suppose that the hope that this eventuality will ensue
is, for some advocates, a motivation for favoring
inflation targeting in the first place.
I shall turn in closing to three narrower and
more specific comments on Faust and Henderson’s
paper. First, they write that, “as a profession we are
more certain about our advice regarding the mean
of inflation” (p. 118) than about what we say regard-
ing the variance (in other words, economic stabiliza-
tion). This may well be true. But even so, a reader
of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature
is entitled to ask just how confident we are on this
score. At the conceptual level, there are at least five
reasons for choosing a mean inflation rate different
from zero: (i) measurement bias; (ii) the “stabilization
buffer” argument that Michael Woodford and Gauti
Eggertsson have recently analyzed at length12; (iii)
the role of inflation as “grease to the labor market,”
as famously argued in James Tobin’s AEA presidential
address and more recently highlighted by Akerlof,
Dickens, and Perry13; (iv) the distortionary tax argu-
ment, to which Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé has already
referred in her comments on Michael Woodford’s
paper at this conference; and (v) the fact that in the
United States today the principal asset bearing a
permanently fixed nominal interest rate (zero) is
currency, together with the apparent facts that much
of the outstanding U.S. currency is held outside the
country and that much of the rest is used by drug
dealers and other criminals on whom we should
want to impose distortionary taxes. At the empirical
level, there is no evidence that mean inflation even
quite far above zero by the standards of today’s indus-
trialized world retards economic growth; Robert
Barro’s work on this question has shown no effect
on growth associated with mean inflation up to 15
percent per annum, and Michael Sarel’s work has
shown no effect up to 8 percent.14
Second, while Faust and Henderson are certainly
correct that a belief in “long and variable lags” is
nowadays part of the common ground of monetary
economics, the familiar attempt to appeal to this
argument as a rationale for inflation targeting is at
best out of place and, more likely, misleading. Milton
Friedman’s classic argument applied not merely to
the attempt to vary the policy instrument in order
to control output, but also to control inflation.
Nothing is lost, or even changed, by rewriting the
notation in Friedman’s 1953 paper to make the left-
hand-side variable π and the key right-hand-side
variable either r or M. The force of the long-and-
variable-lags argument is the implied optimality of
a constant instrument rule (most famously, a con-
stant money growth rule). Long and variable lags do
not constitute an argument for inflation targeting.
Third, Faust and Henderson’s point about the
symmetry of costs applying not just to the mean of
inflation but also to the variability of inflation is both
interesting and important. Referring to the target
range that the central bank announces for inflation,
they rightly point out that “excessive frequency of
being inside the range is also evidence of misbehav-
ior.” An appropriate analytical framework recognizes
that “excessive smoothness and excessive volatility
of inflation are equally costly at the margin in
equilibrium” (p. 125, emphasis added).
In conclusion, I disagree, sharply, with what
increasingly looks like an emerging consensus that
inflation targeting is, if not the optimal framework
for monetary policy, then a close enough approxi-
mation to be about as good a framework as any real-
world central bank can practically hope to have.
More specifically, I do not believe that inflation target-
ing is a framework that the Federal Reserve System
should adopt for the United States. For the many
reasons I have explained in the course of discussing
Faust and Henderson’s paper, my view of inflation
targeting is that of Macaulay’s dunce of the present:
I think inflation targeting would take U.S. monetary
policy too far, in a direction in which we should not
want to go. And in regard to their paper, I am content
to be a dunce of the future. Faust and Henderson
have all the right insights. They fall short only in
not following the implications of these insights far
enough.
14 Barro (1995); Sarel (1996).
12 Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
13 Tobin (1972); Akerlof et al. (2000).
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